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The Observer and the Observed:
Re-imagining Privacy Dichotomies in Information
Privacy Law
By Marcy Peek *
¶1

Information privacy law and scholarship has drawn a flawed dichotomy between
those who violate privacy (the “observers” or “watchers”) and those who have their
privacy violated (the “observed” or the “watched”). For example, theoretical conceptions
of privacy such as the “right to be let alone” dovetailed with Jeremy Bentham’s
nineteenth-century notion of the Panopticon. His concept of the Panopticon was of a
prison, circular in architectural design that had at its center a watch guard tower rising
above the circular prison. The key aspect of the Panopticon was the central watch guard
tower, which was designed with blackened windows that allowed the guards to see out,
but did not allow the prisoners to see in. This created a situation of perfect surveillance
and perfect control; the prisoners had no idea at any given time whether the guards were
watching or even whether the guards were in the tower at all. In fact, no one had to be in
the tower to achieve compliance or maintain control, for the prisoners knew that they
might be surveilled, or not, at any moment of the day or night. Michel Foucault
elaborated on this notion of the Panopticon, by asserting that the Pantopicon is a
representation of the ways in which discipline and punishment are carried out in
contemporary society. In the mid-twentieth century, George Orwell conceived of the
notion of Big Brother in which everyone is watched at virtually all times by the
government. These Orwellian, Foucaultian, and Benthamite notions of privacy centered
around the dichotomous concept of the observer and the observed, or the watcher and the
watched. None of these notions of surveillance take into account the more fluid concept
of the observed and the observer mutually engaging in observation or, to put it another
way, both parties watching each other (whether consensually or not). Information
privacy law generally assumes that a person usually wants privacy and that there is a
watcher-watched relationship wherein a watcher invades a person’s privacy (legally or
not). However, that assumption is driven by the flawed dichotomy between the observed
and the observer and an erroneous assumption that the observed generally desires privacy
vis-à-vis the observer. Once we push at the borders of these assumptions, we begin to
understand that privacy relations are more nuanced than often portrayed by information
privacy law and scholarship. For example, as technology progresses and examples such
as webcams (one-way or two-way), reality shows, long-range imaging devices, videoenhanced cell phones, easily accessible personal information via Internet databases or

* Assistant Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. This paper was originally presented at the annual
Berkeley-George Washington Privacy Law Scholars Conference in June 2009. I thank the organizers of
the conference and the privacy scholars who made significant comments on the paper. I also thank my
research assistant, Nora Aponte, for her work on this project.
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social networking sites etc., become commonplace, the meanings of privacy are altered.
We all take on multiple, shifting roles of the watcher and the watched at various times.
In effect, we are all watching each other. This new paradigm has a myriad of
implications for conceptions of privacy. For example, if one value of privacy is selfdevelopment, and the concept of self-development in a less complicated environment of
relatively stable observed/observer relations is no longer the norm, then privacy becomes
less about self-development and more about constructing identity and the presentation of
self in everyday life. Indeed, as technology progresses, we all end up in the roles of the
watcher and the watched, whether simultaneously or at distinct points in time. The
knowledge that observation is taking place changes the behavior of the observed.
Because observation is ubiquitous in the modern technological world, our conceptions of
normative values such as the ability to shape self-development and self-identity, the
privacy torts, and privacy mandates embodied in federal and state law might need to be
re-imagined.
I. INTRODUCTION

¶3

¶4

This article is the first in a series in which I will explore the modern, complicated
relationship of privacy, technology, and the “observed vs. observer” relationship. In
future articles, I intend to elaborate upon the complicated dance of the observed and the
observer vis-à-vis Fourth Amendment reasonable expectations of privacy, possible
reconceptualizations of the traditional four privacy torts, 1 and the impact that post-9/11
security measures might have on our ruminations about privacy given the new world of
bilateral observation (as explained infra).
In this article, I will build a preliminary foundation for these works by elucidating
how technology and modern privacy relations have changed the nature of privacy (or lack
thereof) and how these modern realities should impact our notions of privacy.
II. THE TRADITIONAL BIG BROTHER CONCEPT OF PRIVACY

¶5

Laypersons and scholars alike have traditionally conceived “privacy” largely as a
concept of being “watched” by some outside, unwanted observer. In the United States,
this concept of privacy, or lack thereof, is consistent with the classic notion of Big
Brother embodied in George Orwell’s classic book, 1984. 2
1
There are four main privacy torts that resulted from Warren and Brandeis’ seminal 1890 article on
privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
They are:

• Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs;
• Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts;
• Publicity which places a person in a false light in the public eye; and
• Appropriation of name or likeness.
See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
2
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin Classics 2004) (1949); see also, Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the
Door: Balancing National Security with Privacy Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375
(2002); Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 413 (2008) (“Of course, George Orwell's
1984 is the most famous literary defense of privacy as a refuge from totalitarianism.”). But see Carl S.
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These concepts (Orwellian, Benthamite, and Foucaultian) have pervaded the
national consciousness for many years. The idea, and fear, of the “observer” watching
the observed, unbeknownst to the observed, pervades modern thinking and the modern
media. Indeed, the notion of Big Brother has become so ubiquitous that it has earned the
title of a now-defunct popular television show. 3
However, this concept of being “watched” by an unwanted outside observer,
although popularized by Orwell, could be traced back to Jeremy Bentham who
introduced it as an effective tool in institutional settings. Later, Orwell brought it to the
forefront as a potential government tool of control even among law-abiding citizens and
Michel Foucault expounded upon it by arguing that such social interactions represented a
new way of gaining power and control by moving beyond the tools of force or fear of
physical punishment. 4
The concepts of the “observed” and. the unwanted “observer” was explored in the
nineteenth-century by Jeremy Bentham, albeit in a prison context. Bentham imagined 5 a
concept of a prison design in which prisoners were watched at all times by prison
guards. 6 Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon 7 was of a prison building, circular in
architectural design that had at its center a watch guard tower rising above the circular
prison. The key aspect of the Panopticon was the central watch guard tower, which was
designed with blackened windows that allowed the guards to see out at all the peripheral
cells, but disallowed the prisoners to see in. Thus, the prisoners could not know whether
or when the guards were watching them at any given moment. This created a situation of
Kaplan, Kafkaesque? Big Brother? Finding the Right Literary Metaphor for Net Privacy, N.Y.TIMES, Feb.
2, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/02/technology/02CYBERLAW.html (noting that “for [Daniel]
Solove, Big Brother is an apt metaphor to describe the effects of surveillance and the invasion of a person's
secret or private world”).
3
Christopher Bantick, Big Brother is Still Watching You, HERALD SUN, July 26, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 13889864.
4
See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995).
5
Unfortunately, as one scholar notes:
Bentham’s own account of his process of political radicalization centered on the
traumatic and massively bitter experience of the abortive Panopticon prison venture. The
endless frustrations and ultimate failure of this effort to construct and manage a
Panopticon Prison in the metropolis constituted, in Graham Wallas’s phrase, “the great
disaster in Bentham’s life.” “He could not speak of the subject without pain,” Bowring
reported. “‘I do not like,’ he would say, ‘to look among Panopticon papers. It is like
opening a drawer where devils are locked up--it is like breaking into a haunted house.’”
The Panopticon campaign dominated Bentham’s activities and reform energies in the
period 1793-1803 and, more briefly, in 1811-12.
David Lieberman, Bentham’s Democracy, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD., 605, 610 (2008) (internal
citations omitted).
6
See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso 1995)
(1787); Miran Bozovic, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 1, 1-27 (Miran
Bozovic ed., 1995) (1787); JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON: OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE (1787), reprinted
in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, at 37, 122-23 (John Bowring ed., 1843); JEREMY BENTHAM,
PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW (1788), reprinted in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (John Hill Burton ed.,
1843); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
7
See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso 1995)
(1787).

53

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

¶9

[2009

perfect surveillance and perfect control, for the prisoners had no idea at any given time
whether the guards were watching or even whether the guards were in the tower at all. In
fact, no one had to be in the tower at any given time, for the prisoners knew that they
might be surveilled at any particular point in time. Therefore the guards and the system
achieved compliance and kept control at all times.
This Benthamite concept 8 was elaborated on by Michel Foucault. 9 Foucault drew
on the work of Bentham to explain the ways in which power and discipline operate in
modern society. Foucault further argued that the notion of the Panopticon represented a
change in modus operandi in discipline to gain compliance rather than the old ways of
execution or public examples of brutality. In essence, the Panopticon was a new means
of power that created more docile people. As one scholar explains:
Decades ago Michel Foucault argued that modern societies had become
increasingly focused on watching and measuring people in order to control them,
to normalize their behavior and to make them docile and obedient. His famous
example was Jeremy Bentham’s idea of a Panopticon--a prison designed so that
the prisoners could always be watched but would not know exactly when. By
making surveillance ubiquitous, governments and private organizations could
discourage behavior they deemed unusual or abnormal. 10

These Orwellian, Foucaultian, and Benthamite notions of the lack of privacy, which can
also be construed as a metaphor for the state-controlled society, centered on the
dichotomous concept of the observer versus the observed, or the watcher versus the
watched.
¶10
Commentators have noted that “[t]he panopticon refuses to go away. Despite the
appearance of a number of critiques . . . the idea of the panopticon still appears routinely
in surveillance discourses . . . . It helps in the exploration of knowledge and power . . .
and is imbricated with a quest for social order and for progressive social change.” 11 As
another scholar has observed:

8

See Judith E. Koons, Earth Jurisprudence: The Moral Value of Nature, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 263,
264 n.6 (2008) (“In the late 1700s, Jeremy Bentham designed a panopticon ‘inspection-house’ for prisons,
‘mad-houses,’ factories, and hospitals that allowed a centrally located observer to see all occupants without
their being able to assess whether they were being observed.”).
9
See Paul Ham, Warrantless Search and Seizure of E-mail and Methods of Panoptical Prophylaxis,
2008 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 090801 (2008). Ham writes:
The panoptical society restricts individual autonomy by “unnecessarily constraining
individual decision-making” through the constant threat of visibility leveraging the
inherently unbalanced power dynamic favoring governmental actors. The post-modern
philosophical ombudsman Michel Foucault theorized upon this effect using Jeremy
Bentham's “panopticon”--an anonymous, omniscient presence in prison architecture.
This panopticon establishes a regime of surveillance that through “discipline and
punishment” oppresses individuals, as well as robs them of their rights to self-expression.
Id. at *21-22.
10
Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008).
11
David Lyon, The Search for Surveillance Theories, in THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON
AND BEYOND 3, 4 (David Lyon ed., Willan Publ’g 2006) (1988).
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Even as information privacy theorists have sought to shift the focus of the
discussion about privacy interests . . . the terms of both academic and public
debate continue to return inexorably to visibility and more particularly to an
understanding of surveillance as direct visual observation by centralized
authority figures. Within popular privacy discourse, this metaphoric mapping
tends to be organized around the anthropomorphic figure of Big Brother.
Academic privacy theorists have tended to favor the motif of the Panopticon, a
model prison proposed by Jeremy Bentham that consists of cells concentrically
arranged around a central guard tower, from which the prison authority might see
but not be seen. Historically and also etymologically, the Panopticon suggests
that direct visual observation by a centralized authority is both the most effective
means and the best exemplar of surveillance for social control. 12

¶11

¶12

¶13

¶14

As I will argue in Part II, these notions of Big Brother and the Panopticon vision of
Foucault and Bentham have become severely outdated in the last decade. These flawed
concepts of Big Brother and the Panopticon currently serve as the principal models that
shape privacy laws; however, these concepts do not take into account the modern realities
of advancing technology and modern privacy relations.
In earlier times, being “observed” was largely a result of either being imprisoned,
literally, or being psychologically imprisoned by one’s small community of family,
friends, and small social network. Technology was not a force of observance, and thus
one could go about daily life with the assurance that unless one was involved in activity
that, for example, generally endangered the community or one’s familial or close social
ties, generally personal activities were exactly that – personal and private.
Of course, while the academic literature of figures such as Orwell, Foucault, and
Bentham created a nightmarish vision of surveillance and a complete lack of privacy,
these remained academic and hypothetical versions of what daily life might be like if
government or private entities enforced means of uncontrolled observance via technology
or sophisticated architecture. Thus, for most of society, extreme and unwanted privacy
invasions were largely a matter of science fiction and criminal imprisonment, and were
the antithesis of democracy and the normative values of our society.
However, the vast majority of Americans no longer live in villages and small
towns, surrounded by family, friends, and neighbors who utilize gossip and peeping to
erode our privacy. Those means of intruding into one’s privacy are largely outdated.
This social phenomenon changed with the advancement of technology, the Internet, the
proliferation of large cities, and the disappearance of small social networks represented
by close networks of people located in small towns.
In sum, the traditional, classic notions of privacy, depicted most concretely by
notions of Big Brother and the Panopticon, represent the “unilateral vector” of privacy, in
which the observer is at the center with power over the observed.
Sometimes the
observed is oblivious to being watched, and at other times knows she might be watched at
any given time – but there is no mutual engaging of observation (the latter representing
the “bilateral vector,” as I will expound upon in Part II).

12

Julie Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparence, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 184 (2008).
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III. THE DICHOTOMIES DRAWN IN INFORMATION PRIVACY
¶15

Information privacy law and scholarship have drawn a flawed dichotomy between
those who violate privacy (the “observers” or “watchers”) and those who have their
privacy violated (the “observed” or the “watched”). None of these notions, which are
fundamentally notions of surveillance, take into account the more fluid, modern reality
and concept of the observed and the observer mutually engaging in observation. That is,
both parties (whether consensually or not) are watching each other.
¶16
Information privacy law generally assumes that a person usually wants privacy and
that there is a watcher-watched relationship in which a watcher invades a person’s
privacy (legally or not). In other words, the default assumption is that the observed does
not want to be watched. However, that assumption is driven by a false dichotomy
between the observed and the observer and the sometimes erroneous assumption that the
observed generally desires privacy vis-à-vis the observer. 13
¶17
In today’s world, we should move beyond many of the traditional notions of
information privacy because of modern privacy relations, largely caused by the
advancement of technology. Consider two examples. First, as some scholars have noted,
we need to expand upon the limited notion of “Big Brother”, the Panopticon, and the
prisoner-versus-prisonee paradigm. 14 In this paradigm—the “unilateral vector,” in which
one party is watching the other—the watched may or may not know they are being
watched. In those cases where the observed is unaware that she is being watched—for
example, by means of concealed street cameras or department store cameras—this
“unilateral vector” is relatively straightforward. In other words, the unilateral watching is
carried out unbeknownst to the watched, and there is no “relational” aspect to the
situation.
¶18
For example, the watched/observed person moves about her or his day generally
ignorant of the pervasiveness of street cameras, retail establishment surveillance systems,
and other such devices that record every move the person makes. As some scholars such
as Daniel Solove have noted, 15 this creates a situation where the aggregation of
13

As David Lyon asks: “Is the Panopticon [and its ilk] a diversion, a distraction from much more
important issues that we miss at our peril through an obsessive fixation with the prison paradigm?” Lyon,
supra note 11, at 9.
14
See Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A
Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803, 830-831 (2009) (“The important part is not so much the
watching, but rather that we all know we are being watched. It’s as if we, who are responsible for all this
(and this would seem to be nearly all of us), had read Foucault’s account of the panopticon and decided it
was way cool and that we should institute our own version as soon as possible.”).
15
See Daniel Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
1227, 1233 (2003). Solove notes:
A difficulty I have described as the “aggregation problem” complicates the application of
tort law in specific cases. In isolation, a particular piece of information may not be very
invasive of one’s privacy. But when pieces of information are combined, they may form
a detailed account of an individual, what I have referred to as a “digital biography.” The
whole may be greater than the sum of the parts. This phenomenon occurs because
information that is not revealing alone can be quite revealing in combination with other
pieces of information.
Id. at 1233. See generally DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR AND PRIVACY
(Yale Univ. Press 2007).

ON THE INTERNET
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“observing” technology enables the private and public sector to create a near perfect
picture of the full spectrum of a person’s day and a person’s life. Significantly, this is
much different from the traditional phenomenon of gossip, peeping, and observance in
small towns, in which a person’s life was sporadically observed by distinct individuals at
random points in time. Instead, in today’s American society, a person, once he or she
leaves the sanctity of his or her home, is observed and watched virtually twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week.
This phenomenon is a straightforward “unilateral vector” observance, in which the
observed moves about her daily life with little or no cognizance regarding when or if her
daily life is mapped and monitored virtually from the moment she leaves her home until
the moment she arrives back into the confines of her home.
However where people realize or suspect that they are being watched (as in the
Panopticon scenario), the unilateral vector becomes infiltrated with a layer of human
relations that do not exist in the pure unilateral vector. While not aware of the extent of
public observance by unseen monitoring systems, many people in today’s society
understand that they are being watched by a public or private entity and act accordingly.
In other words, they may or may not be being observed at any given moment, but their
behavior is affected by the mere fact that they are likely to be under observance.
This phenomenon I term the “relational unilateral vector.” It is so termed because
there is an implicit relational aspect to the watcher/watched relationship, in which the
watched responds to possible observance by altering her or his patterns of behavior based
upon what they believe the watcher wants to observe, and to fit the pattern of a “normal”
and law-abiding citizen.
To complicate matters, this modern monitoring technology has brought us to a
point where people not only realize that they are being watched, but may actually enjoy
the notion of being watched by an anonymous or non-anonymous, outside observer. 16
Thus the “relational unilateral vector” becomes multi-layered. It is one thing to suspect
that one is being observed and to alter one’s behavior accordingly. It goes a step further
to enter the public realm with certainty and revel in the notion that one is being observed,
akin to taking one’s fifteen minutes of fame, so to speak.
Second, in the last few years we have seen a shift from simply enjoying being
watched to a phenomenon of enjoying “watching each other”; in other words, the watcher
and the watched become mutual observers and derive intellectual, psychological, and/or
sexual satisfaction from knowing what the other is doing at discrete times or at all times.
This phenomenon I term the “bilateral relational vector.”

16
See Josh Blackmun, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy In Public, and The Right To Your Digital
Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual’s Image over the Internet, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 313 (2009) (emphasis added). Blackmun writes:

Pervasive and indiscriminate omniveillance tools amass vast quantities of information
about anyone who has done nothing to put himself in the limelight, with absolutely no
discretion. The cameras are always rolling, and a person never knows when he will be
photographed. In essence, you cannot stay away from it. Everyone gets their fifteen
minutes of fame, whether they want it or not.
Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
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For example, at the simplest level, studies have shown that factory workers change
their behavior based on the knowledge that they are being observed (the unilateral
relational vector). 17 More profound are those increasingly pervasive instances in which
the person prefers to be watched and prefers to simultaneously watch (e.g., webcams).
The observer becomes the observed and the observed becomes the observer. In other
words, privacy relations can become a dance between the observed and the observer in
which there is a fluidity of privacy relations. As technology progresses, we all end up in
the roles of the watcher and the watched, whether simultaneously or at sequential points
in time. This is, of course, a generational shift. It has, in part, been brought on by the
incredibly rapid advancement of technology, but it has also been caused by our younger
generation’s implicit understanding that privacy in the modern world has been largely
eroded and, in many cases, eroded by choice.
¶25
Once we push at the borders of the implicit assumptions of the observed-versusobserver paradigm, we begin to understand that privacy relations are more nuanced than
often portrayed by information privacy law and scholarship. As technology progresses,
our experience of privacy—or lack thereof—rapidly changes. Moreover, as technologies
such as webcams (one-way or two-way), reality shows, long-range imaging devices,
video-enhanced cell phones, easily accessible personal information via Internet databases
or social networking sites proliferate, our paradigms of privacy rapidly shift. One
commentator explains:
Much of today’s Web activity involves the creation and consumption of “social
media.” This term broadly describes the various ways that Internet users interact
with one another online, and comprises such activities as creating and
commenting on blogs, uploading and sharing user-generated content, such as
video and photos, and communicating with friends through social networking
sites such as MySpace or Facebook. Typically, when new members join a social
networking site, they design an online profile page, which allows them to
communicate with other members through email, instant messaging (IM), or
electronic bulletin board postings. A member’s online profile can be open to all
or access can be limited only to “friends” or “buddies.” 18

Other commentators have described the social phenomena of webcams and like
technologies:

17

Cf. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 64 (Doubleday Anchor Books
1959) (“[T]here is hardly a legitimate everyday vocation or relationship whose performers do not engage in
concealed practices which are incompatible with fostered impressions.”). Goffman continues:
[A]ctivity oriented toward work-tasks tend to be converted into activity oriented toward
communication . . . . sufficient self-control is exerted . . . an idealized impression is
offered by accentuating certain facts and concealing others . . . . All of these general
characteristics of performances can be seen as interaction constraints which play upon the
individual and transform his activities into performances.
Id. at 65.
Kathryn S. Vander Broek et al., Schools and Social Media: First Amendment Issues Arising From
Student Use of the Internet, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 11, 11 (2009).
18
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Use of e-mail and instant messaging has eroded physical distances and social
barriers. GPS devices help us navigate streets and forests, while enabling other
people to know exactly where we are. Computers collect and analyze our online
browsing and buying habits . . . . Blogs, chat rooms, and webcams let strangers
into our minds and into our homes. With increasing popularity, social
networking sites encourage people to volunteer personal information—from their
demographic characteristics to their musical tastes—for strangers to peruse. 19

As these technologies and social means of communicating become commonplace, the
meanings of privacy are altered, and we all take on multiple, shifting roles of the watcher
and the watched at various times. In effect, we are all watching each other. 20
IV. PRIVACY AND SELF-IDENTITY IN THE MODERN AGE
These new social and technological conditions 21 have a myriad of implications for
conceptions of privacy. At this juncture, it is appropriate to move beyond the descriptive
question—regarding modern unilateral and bilateral privacy relations—to the normative
question of how law should reflect real life experiences and how the practical realities of
our lives should influence the law.
¶27
If the observer-observed relationship is a flawed paradigm in regard to modern
privacy relations, then this necessitates a re-thinking of our stance toward privacy in
modern American law. For example, as discussed earlier, American privacy law has
generally assumed that the “observed” often prefers not to be observed, is often unaware
of observation, and is, for all practical purposes, at odds with the observer. Furthermore,
because of the assumed privacy relations engendered by the default assumption of a
unilateral privacy relationship, some scholars argue that various values of privacy, such
as the right to be let alone and the value of unimpeded self-development, are undermined.
Legal scholars such as Julie Cohen have argued that a crucial value of personal privacy is
self-development. Cohen observed:

¶26

The point is not that people will not learn under conditions of no-privacy, but that
they will learn differently, and that the experience of being watched will
constrain, ex ante, the acceptable spectrum of belief and behavior. Pervasive
monitoring of every first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices
toward the bland and the mainstream. The result will be a subtle yet fundamental
shift in the content of our character, a blunting and blurring of rough edges and
sharp lines. But rough edges and sharp lines have intrinsic, archetypal value
within our culture. . . . The condition of no-privacy threatens not only to chill the
expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of
our aspirations to it.

19

Jason Mazzone & Matthew Moore, The Secret Life of Patents, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 33 (2008).
But cf. PHILIPPA STRUM, PRIVACY: THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945, at 4 (Cengage
Learning 1998) (“[H]uman beings appear to share a need for periods of time and space away from each
other, although the form privacy takes is very much a function of time and place, of society and class.”).
21
See generally Wikipedia, List of Social Networking Sites, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
social_networking_websites (last visited June 1, 2009).
20

59

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2009

The autonomy fostered by informational privacy also generates more concrete
collective benefits. Development of the capacity for autonomous choice is an
indispensable condition for reasoned participation in the governance of the
community and its constituent institutions—political, economic, and social. 22

¶28

¶29

¶30

¶31

Cohen’s work is generally a discussion of the unilateral relational vector, not the pure
unilateral vector. Her work can be said to be an argument that constant or frequent
observation (known by the observed) is detrimental to the individual because such
observation influences the choices one makes in everyday life about what one will let into
one’s life, such as what books to read, what information to take in, or even what kind of
people with whom to interact. This, she argues, undermines the natural course of
individualization.
While Cohen’s argument has merit, the notion of allowing of a self-chosen selfidentity is also a value of privacy, and one that is becoming more significant as bilateral
privacy relations proliferate. In other words, my argument expands on Cohen’s work by
also incorporating the paradigm of the bilateral relational vector, which does not, of
course, render the unilateral relational vector obsolete. Both dynamics of privacy are part
of the modern conception of privacy. Moreover, this argument incorporates the notion
that bilateral relational observation may be either detrimental for the individual or
beneficial for the individual because bilateral observation may mute the process of
choosing one’s identity or it may accelerate and strengthen the natural choosing of one’s
identity.
Once we pierce the surface of this myopic focus on the unwanted watcher, Big
Brother, and the unstated yet prevalent notion of the Peeping Tom (whether vis-à-vis a
private or governmental relationship), much more complex patterns of behavior and
sociology begin to emerge. These complex patterns that are engendered by both the
unilateral and bilateral relations of privacy reflect the various power dynamics involved
and the notion of the allowance of a self-chosen, self-identity as a value of privacy. That
is to say, there is a fundamental power dynamic inherent in a unilateral observer
relationship, in which the observed has little or no power in regard to the observation.
But when and where the observed complicates the power dynamic by either simply
becoming aware of the observation and acting according to her interests because she is
aware of the observation (the “unilateral relational vector”), or where she engages in
mutual observation and therefore engenders a fluid power dynamic of watcher/watched
(the “bilateral vector”), this must affect our traditional conceptions of privacy. More
specifically, one cannot fundamentally understand modern information privacy law
without recognizing that self-identity as a function of what we have traditionally called
privacy. Self-identity is a function of privacy because the parameters of one’s selfidentity—and the extent to which one is allowed to construct the self—has a direct causal
relationship with the nature and extent of one’s experience of privacy.
If, for example, a person’s privacy is minimal due to her or his choice to engage in
bilateral privacy relations, the construction of her or his self and identity will be directly
affected. We might imagine that this hampers the construction of the self, because the
observers/observed might construct a self-identity in accordance with the expectations of
22

Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Information Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1373, 1426 (2000).
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the observer(s). For example, a teenager might construct a notion of self based on what
her friends on Facebook think is “hot” at the moment. But one could also imagine a
situation in which self-identity engendered by the erosion of privacy due to bilateral
privacy relations is actually accelerated and strengthened by a person’s rebellion against
the hampering of her construction of identity. The attempted hampering of this
construction of self might engender a strengthened self-will and the construction of an
identity as one who rejects standard societal and privacy norms. Thus, for example, that
same teenager may contemplate how her identity does or does not fit in with the “status
quo” for her group based on a myriad of bilateral relations, and may decide to construct
an identity that is self-chosen and intentionally subversive of the status quo. In this case,
the back and forth of mutual observation is beneficial because it allows one to play the
dance of mutual observation as a means of choosing a self-identity based on a sliding
scale of conformance or rejection of the status quo of the particular bilateral set or group.
In other words, muted privacy may lead to individuals who construct identity by
conforming to mainstream notions of identity or persons whose self-identity is formed by
a strengthening of the self-will and a desire to construct one’s self-identity by rejecting
traditional patterns that tend to erode privacy. Thus, self-identity and the construction
thereof are a function of privacy because privacy relations affect how one reacts to her or
his experiences of privacy and constructs one’s identity based on these experiences.
We can now begin to understand that privacy very much includes the personal
choosing of how we decide to embrace or reject outside observation into our space based
upon how we want the world to view us and how we want to view ourselves. As we
begin to ponder these issues in regard to privacy law, we must begin to ask questions that
are fundamental to the underpinnings of privacy law. How, for example, might this
affect our notions of how the four privacy torts 23 and privacy laws in general should
include the more complex notions of both bilateral and unilateral privacy relations? As
just one example, we must acknowledge that the common law of privacy and the four
privacy torts were developed in an earlier, simpler era in which the unilateral vector of
privacy was the dominant phenomenon.
But, more importantly, we begin to question to what extent the privacy torts are
still relevant in today’s world, because of the advancement of technology and the ensuing
effect that this has on the diminution of unilateral privacy relationships and the
continuing proliferation of bilateral privacy relationships. As I argue below, privacy (or
the lack thereof) sometimes becomes less about self-development and more about
constructing identity and, as Erving Goffman elucidated, the presentation of self in
everyday life. 24
For example, it is one thing to argue that intrusions into privacy affect one’s ability
to be secluded and unencumbered by unwanted outside observance, or to argue that
intrusions into privacy render impossible or difficult one’s ability to choose what she
wants to read, what movies she wants to watch, or how she chooses to reveal her body in
public; in other words, to render impossible the ways in which her choices are influenced
or disrupted by society—i.e., self-development. But it is quite to understand that privacy
or lack thereof is not only often self-chosen, but is also a mutual dance between observer

23
24

See Prosser, supra note 1, at 389.
See generally GOFFMAN, supra note 17.
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and observed in which the observed often willingly allows the complicated notion of
“privacy” or lack thereof to form her self-constructed notion of identity, that is, who she
is, how or what she thinks, and what her place is in the world.
¶36
As Erving Goffman observed in the mid-twentieth century, human beings react
differently and engage in a virtual “theatre” when they believe they are being observed. 25
When there is no knowledge of observance, the “mask” that we present to the world is
dropped. However, when there is a “unilateral relational vector” or a “bilateral relational
vector,” the individual typically goes to all measures to construct an identity for the world
that he or she believes conforms to society’s expectations. “[W]hen an individual
appears before others he [or she] will have many motives for trying to control the
impression they receive of the situation.” 26 And in a situation of the “relational bilateral
vector,” construction of identity becomes two-sided and even more sophisticated and
complex.
When two teams present themselves to each other for purposes of interaction, the
members of each team tend to maintain the line that they are what they claim to
be; they tend to stay in character. . . . At the same time, each team tends to
suppress its candid view of itself and of the other team, projecting a conception
of self and conception of other that is relatively acceptable to the other. 27

¶37

Specifically, the new social phenomenon of the “relational bilateral vector” has
brought us to the point where people not only sometimes enjoy the aspect of mutual
observance, but they also revel in the opportunity to shift identities, play with identity, 28
and render identity fluid. Relevant examples include Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and
cell phones that enable one to identify a friend’s location in real time via GPS. 29
Goffman’s point ties into the larger point of this article: the notion that observation is
ubiquitous in the modern, technological world, and thus that our conceptions of
normative values (such as self-identity, reasonable expectations of privacy, the privacy
torts, and privacy mandates embodied in federal and state law) might need to be reimagined.
¶38
As I have argued elsewhere, “some commentators have criticized the notion of
fluidity of identity as a means of escaping stereotypes and harassment online.” 30 Yet this
new means of fluidity of identity seems to have a new meaning: that of pushing at the
25

See generally id.
Id. at 15.
27
Id. at 167.
28
David Lyon has observed that even “the post-panoptics . . . lack attention to crucial dimensions such
as socio-economic class, gender, and ethnicity which today must be applied in areas of literal (CCTV) as
well as [non-literal] (data mining) ‘watching’; not to mention ‘watch lists.’” Lyon, supra note 11.
29
Many applications which are now omnipresent in the use of networking sites also serve to reinforce
the notion that less privacy equals greater popularity, at least in the virtual world. For example, Rob
Cottingham, president of the social media marketing company Social Signal, says: “There are so many
metrics out there that tell you how you are doing, or appear to tell you how you are doing -- you have this
many friends on Facebook, you have this many followers on Twitter -- all these serve to tell you what kind
of impact you are having.” Gillian Shaw, More Leading Dual Lives through Networking Sites, THE
WINDSOR STAR, Mar. 23, 2009, available at
http://www2.canada.com/windsorstar/news/life/story.html?id=45f86332-20f5-4b07-ac2b-b359fa13e881.
30
Marcy Peek, Passing Beyond Identity on the Internet: Espionage & Counterespionage in the Internet
Age, 28 VT. L. REV. 91, 118 (2003).
26
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boundaries of privacy and embracing the realities of a modern world in which enjoyment
and meaningful social interaction can be achieved by eradicating socially enforced norms
of privacy.
¶39
Jeffrey Rosen has written about the “growing culture of self-revelation.” 31 Yet his
focus is more on the idea that without privacy, one’s “real” persona might be
misunderstood because of the demons of gossip, a tabloid world, and an ever-connected
global social sphere enabled by technology. 32 But contrary to Rosen’s concerns,
MySpace, Facebook, and the ever-proliferating online websites in which individuals can
engage in relational bilateral observance actually enable individuals to construct and
present an identity of their choosing. As one example, the Obama administration has
decided to use Facebook, MySpace and Twitter to present the image of the administration
that they want to present to the outside world. 33 This is clearly a move towards
construction of identity, albeit the identity of a governmental administration. As one
commentator has observed, “[t]he social networking sites are just the latest in the
administration's efforts to make information widely available, and they join YouTube,
Flickr, iTunes and Vimeo as places to find official content.” 34
¶40
“Privacy,” in other words, can be understood as a concept revolving around the
notion of imposition into one’s life, or it can be understood as a complex set of notions
that engender fluctuating presentations and self-understandings of identity 35 as more and
more people construct their identity by controlling the way in which they are viewed and
the manner in which their personalities are exposed to the outside world via bilateral
relations of privacy. 36 I do not mean to argue that these new modes of social
interaction—largely brought about by the rapid advancement of technology—are
normatively good. Rather, this article aims to advance our understanding of where
personal privacy is at the moment and where it is headed given the realities of our
contemporary, technology-centric age. 37 Moreover, it is unwise to ignore the dangerous
side of social networking sites and the new self-imposed erosion of privacy in the attempt
to create one’s own identity. As Danielle Kean Citron notes:
Social networking sites and blogs have increasingly become breeding grounds for
anonymous online groups that attack women, people of color, and members of
other traditionally disadvantaged groups. These destructive groups target
individuals with defamation, threats of violence, and technology-based attacks
that silence victims and concomitantly destroy their privacy. Victims go offline
31
See generally JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
(Random House 2000).
32
Id.at 3-25.
33
See, e.g., Chris Snyder, Government Agencies Make Friends With New Media, WIRED, Mar. 25, 2009,
http://blog.wired.com/business/2009/03/government-agen.html.
34
Michael Hardy, Obama Administration Joins Facebook, FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK, May 4, 2009,
http://fcw.com/articles/2009/05/04/web-white-house-on-facebook.aspx.
35
See STRUM, supra note 20, at 201 (“Privacy has become an endangered species but . . . it is not yet
extinct.”).
36
Cf. Gloria C. Cox, Privacy: The Lost Right, LAW AND POLITICS BOOK REVIEW, May 4, 2009,
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/reviews/2009/05/privacy-lost-right.html (“Occasionally, someone will
take a person or business to court for violation of their information privacy, only to hear from the courts
that people have no privacy interest whatsoever in their bank records, telephone numbers, Internet
Addresses, or other information.”).
37
See STRUM, supra note 20, at 198.
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or assume pseudonyms to prevent future attacks, impoverishing online dialogue
and depriving victims of the social and economic opportunities associated with a
vibrant online presence. Attackers manipulate search engines to reproduce their
lies and threats for employers and clients to see, creating digital “scarlet letters”
that ruin reputations. 38

If we intend to engage in thoughtful discussion about privacy and its limits, we cannot
ignore the truth of privacy and the means by which generational and technological truths
come into play and influence objective social norms of privacy. This has significant
implications for legal standards such as the privacy torts, statutory law, case law, and the
“reasonable expectations of privacy” test stemming from the Fourth Amendment. This
article is meant to bring to the forefront a largely under-addressed reality of privacy (or
lack thereof): that it is a function of the construction of identity, by choice, brought about
by technology, human desire, personal volition, and the choice to engage in “bilateral
relational” privacy experiences.
V. CONCLUSION
¶41

The value of privacy presented here as a means of promoting the construction of
self and one’s unique identity—based on the modern reality of bilateral relational
experiences of privacy—has a variety of implications for the future of information
privacy law and our understandings of where information privacy law and scholarship
might be (or normatively should be) headed. 39 I briefly consider two such implications.
¶42
First, the values of information privacy law embodied in the four traditional
privacy torts 40 (and essentially conceived in the late nineteenth century in a
fundamentally different world) might be reconstrued. For example, the tort of intrusion
into seclusion might be conceived of differently if our notion of “intrusion” moves away
from the implicit notion of the right to be let alone. Intrusion implies unwanted,
unilateral observance. As this paper implies, such an implication cannot be seriously
considered in a vacuum in our modern world of shifting relations between the watcher
and the watched; a relationship which is sometimes mutual, sometimes desired, and often
much too complicated to be simplified as an argument that there has been unwanted
observance from a known or unknown other party.
¶43
Naturally, this implies that the standard for “intrusions into seclusion” might be
lowered to accommodate the fact of bilateral relational observance. It may also mean
viewing privacy as a spectrum/gradation, depending upon exposure/consent given by the
individual. But, correspondingly, on a case-specific basis, it might heighten the standard.
If, for example, a lone misanthrope leads a Thoreau-like life in which it is clear that he

38

Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62 (2009).
Although this paper does not discuss constitutional issues of privacy, it is necessary in almost any
discussion of information privacy to ponder whether the Fourth Amendment concept of “reasonable
expectation of privacy” is implicated by the rapid advancements in technology that have tended to befuddle
federal courts in deciding information privacy cases. Cf. Frank R. Cooper, Surveillance and Identity
Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by Martin Luther King, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517,
536 (2008) (applying Judith Butler’s theory of identity performance – the idea that “we create our identities
by acting in ways that are designed to give others a certain impression” – to the Fourth Amendment.”).
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See Warren & Brandeis, supra, note 1.
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has little or no patience or desire for bilateral relational observance, then “intrusion” will
likely have a very different meaning for him than it might for, say, certain celebrities –
Paris Hilton and Lindsay Lohan – who clearly enjoy and encourage these bilateral
observances. In other words, the tort of intrusion into seclusion should incorporate an
understanding of self-chosen means of eroding privacy as a means of constructing
identity.
¶44
Second, the privacy mandates embodied in federal and state informational privacy
law might be rethought and perhaps amended. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act (“COPPA”) is one example. The Federal Trade Commission (the federal agency
trarged with enfrorcing COPPA) describes it in the following way:
[COPPA] gives parents control over what information websites can collect from
their kids. Any website for kids under 13, or any general site that collects
personal information from kids it knows are under 13, is required to comply with
COPPA. . . .
Thanks to COPPA, sites have to get a parent’s permission if they want to collect
or share your kids’ personal information, with only a few exceptions. That goes
for what information sites ask for up-front, and information your kids choose to
post about themselves. Personal information includes your child’s full name,
address, email address, or cell phone number.
Under COPPA, sites also have to post privacy policies that give details about
what kind of information they collect from kids — and what they might do with
it . . . . 41

Implicit in COPPA is the desire to not only protect children from marketing or sexual
predators, but also the desire to allow parents to determine the ambit of the world in
which their children reside and what their children know. This desire clearly speaks to
values such as self-development and the right to be alone, but it also smacks of a
paternalistic notion that children’s identities should be allowed to be formed largely by
their parents’ notion of what their children’s identities should ultimately become. For
example, if a child is interested in playing the popular socially-interactive video game
World of Warcraft, it is often likely that the child is interested in exploring a fantasy
world where she or he can embody different personas, join different groups of friends,
and determine whether she or he prefers, for example, an explicitly gendered identity
such as male or female (or even an aggressive or passive persona), or an identity of
ambiguous gender. COPPA restrains such constructions of self-identity by allowing
parents to determine whether such constructions should be allowed.
¶45
Of course, one must be careful in assuming—particularly in the context of
children—that personal social identity construction is always normatively desirable. 42
Yet, ultimately, suggesting that individualistic, atomistic persons are harmed by intrusive
privacy invasions without simultaneously engaging in an understanding of construction
of the self by means of constructing identity via unilateral relational interactions or
41

FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING KIDS’ PRIVACY 1-2 (2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/tech/tec08.pdf .
42
Cf. Anita Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999).

65

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2009

bilateral relational interactions is flawed, and ultimately threatens to undermine the
relevance of information privacy law.
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